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Bridgewater Systems: The Challenges of Mature Start-Ups

Original post on 20 February, 2009

http://venturelaw.blogspot.com/2009/02/bridgewater-systems-challenges-of.html

By Suzanne Dingwall 

I’ve been fascinated by the recent press surrounding Ottawa-based Bridgewater Systems, whose current circumstances illustrate well the challenges of a public start-up. 

Bridgewater is one of the last Ottawa telecom start-ups to attract significant venture capital, from Vengrowth, EagleOne/Newbury, Terry Matthews’ Wesley Clover and even from strategic investor Alcatel-Lucent, among others. The company had been publicly contemplating an IPO since the early 2000s, before finally biting the bullet in 2007, driven in part by the desire of some of its VCs to generate some cash from their investment. 

Here’s where things get interesting. Despite becoming a public company, Bridgewater’s board post-IPO looks more like a private board – comprised of VC nominees, management and in one case a strategic consultant to the business. Great set of board members, but their strengths all appear to lie on the operational side. Which perhaps explains why the Company appears to have left itself without any defensive mechanisms to stave off the overtures of hedge funds such as Crescendo Partners.

Why is being a target an issue? It’s not, if you think your company’s stock is trading at a reasonable value. But whose is at the moment? Even in the best of cases, boards today who have received attractive offers from hedge funds find themselves unable to make a recommendation to their shareholders, due to the reluctance of advisors to give fairness opinions in support of that recommendation. 

Public company boards often have in place tools that allow them to slow down or discourage proxy fights to ensure that the best price is obtained in these kinds of circumstances. At our firm, we try to ensure that our public clients understand the kinds of shareholder defenses that can be put in place from day one following an IPO – from the simplest (staggered board terms, which make it hard to replace the entire board in a proxy fight) to a shareholder rights plan and beyond.

As more and more start-ups making the transition to the public markets to accommodate the liquidity needs of their VCs, shareholder defenses are becoming a start-up issue, too. Public company boards differ from those of private ones in that they must split their focus between (a) oversight of operations and (b) awareness of stock market dynamics and how they might affect shareholder value. It’s important to expand the skill set of any company as it transitions from private to public to include someone who understands proxy fights and market dynamics. 

The irony here is that companies like Bridgewater, who spent their formative years working towards an exit for their first backers, may well find themselves on the liquidity merry-go-round once more. Hedge Funds generally seek the same return on investment within the same time frame as VCs. Stay tuned.

 

Government Investment in Venture Capital: Should There Be Rules?

By Suzanne Dingwall

Another election is over, which means the planning for the next federal budget has begun. Entrepreneurs should be taking this opportunity to place themselves at the forefront of the innovation debate, and grabbing some of the money that the government keeps allocating to research and venture capital.

Before we do that, however, we should ask ourselves whether current government initiatives can be shaped or adjusted to provide some near term relief. Take the money provided by government (through “fund of funds” programs) to venture capital funds to disburse to entrepreneurs: should there be some checks and balances on how it’s spent?

This is not an insignificant issue. Provincial “funds of funds” such as Ontario’s Technology Innovation Fund, Alberta’s Enterprise Corporation, and the like have been allocated hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars in the aggregate to reinvest in venture capital funds. In addition, in February, the federal government also gave the BDC another $75 million in fresh capital to invest directly in high growth companies (those of you who missed that lifeline should be talking to them). Should government-provided venture capital be treated differently than money provided to VCs from private sources?

If the cycles of the last ten years have taught us anything, it’s that economic recession can lead to aggressive pricing and investing terms from venture capital investors. Down round valuations, ratchets and protective mechanisms – all the old standbys. I have even heard that the multiple liquidation preference (where an investor must get 3-4x his investment back before any other shareholder receives proceeds from a company sale) is back in town. Is it fair for those remaining angels and VCs to take advantage of market conditions? Of course. But is it appropriate to allow them to do so when the funds they are investing came from us, the taxpayers? I don’t think so.

How are Canadian entrepreneurs protected from being goudged? There needs to be some kind of oversight mechanism which will allow government to pressure VC recipients to behave in a reasonable fashion, above the market frenzy. To be specific: no multiple liquidation preferences. No usurious interest rates. And while we’re at it: if the purpose underlying these funds is to foster strong homegrown investment funds, why not insist that VCs who receive government funds embark on mandatory education, so that there is a minimum standard of financial, operational and governance competency? Surely the government entities disbursing money can insist on some strings attached to their commitments.

No question, these kinds of strings may impact the IRR of any VC who takes government money. But perhaps the best way for VCs to look at this funding is as a taxpayer bridge loan. We taxpayers don’t need to see a 30% IRR; we’re just trying to bridge VCs to the next phase in the cycle. If we get our money back, that will be perfectly fine. In the near term, however, we’ll also have kept current entrepreneurs who’ve already proven themselves in the game, with a meaningful stake in the businesses they’ve built.

The Case for Canadian Venture Capital

As a lawyer for entrepreneurs, I am often frustrated by my clients’ reluctance to seek local venture capital. There is a persistent view that Canadian venture capital is somehow second best to American or other foreign funds. This may or may not be true. (My own view is that having a rock star U.S. VC backing you won’t make a good business great; it may, however, help you fail more slowly.) What is clear is that there remains a growing divide between entrepreneurs and venture investors which needs to be addressed.

While this may seem to be about you, this post in fact is all about me. The continued health of my business depends on an expanding, sustainable base of good, well-fed entrepreneurs. I don’t believe this is achievable unless there is an alignment of startups and venture capital into one community. While there are many aspects to this issue, at its heart, it’s a question of marketing.

Is there any other industry that has so sharply felt the impact of negative publicity as has venture capital? Take a look south of the border: one day, everyone’s trading tips on the best place in Carmel to park your MIG. Then Blackstone files a prospectus disclosing private equity executive compensation and CEO Stephen Schwarzmann holds a few multi-million dollar parties. Next thing you know, Congress is overhauling its taxation of carried interests for everyone. Venture Capital may be the worst marketed industry out there.

Canadian private equity has been tarred with the same Blackstone feather in the public eyes, if only because it has not provided an alternate mission statement to the public at large and entrepreneurs in particular. I tip my hat to those labour-sponsored funds, who, in their heyday, tried to make the connection between job creation and local investing. Very few would argue, however, that the public right now sees much difference between venture capital and vulture capital.

If Canadian innovation is to scale, there needs to be a call to action for all participants in the ecosystem. This is a marketing exercise that needs to be led by you, the VCs. When was the last time you went to a bootcamp? Provided sponsorship dollars to entrepreneur-generated initiatives? Extended your channels in the US to provide a broader network for your portfolio? Many of these events are not immediately accretive to you, but they are vital to community creation. Let me re-phrase that; there has never been a more vital startup community, but it is one being fostered largely without VC involvement. This must not continue. The need to take a long-term approach to deal flow has never been greater.

Of course, it always helps to have a deep-seeded conviction that local partnering between VCs and startups matters. For me, this is the biggest missing piece: a mission statement that everyone can embrace. It’s also the easiest to solve. Think of the consequences of leakage (one of the most polarizing terms in the international development community). Every dollar of investment that comes from outside Canada ultimately leaks profit and wealth creation outside of Canada. There cannot be sustainable growth if the benefit of local innovation is reaped beyond our boundaries by private equity tourists. Every entrepreneur should feel a moral (if not economic) imperative to include Canadian VCs as part of its growth plans, and to serve as ambassadors for you abroad, directing deal flow from beyond your way (leak unto others as they leak unto you).

It’s time for you to make them believers.

I Was A Teenage VC

They say there is a broken heart for every carried interest still on Bay Street. I can’t say for certain that this is the case; after all, I never knew the pain of investing in YOUtopia or Where’s Frankie. However, as a member of the VC Class of 2000, I did experience first hand some of our industry’s growing pains. Here’s my story:

It was the spring of 2000: NASDAQ was falling apart but, mercifully, the boy band N’SYNC was still together. I received a call from a local headhunter. BCE Capital was looking for new team members; was I interested? I was particularly fond of VCs at that moment, since the group behind my last company had managed to find someone who would pay $470 million for it. So I agreed.


Everything I know to be true about the value of Canadian venture capital I learned in those next two years. That’s not to say that venture capital is a perfect industry. If we’re being honest, some of you can’t park for beans. Given the number of scrapes you’ve collectively placed on the pristine walls of California’s many parking garages, it’s a wonder they still allow Canadians to attend CTIA at all. And others need to seriously rethink your pant choices. Like the fabless semiconductor industry, the moment for acid wash jeans has long passed.

But the patience and mentorship of those who welcomed us in the Class of 2000 ranks has had long-lasting effects. Many of us who moved on have remained active in the start-up community in other forms. I think this is in large part because we were taught how when to embrace and support entrepreneurial risk. The hardest thing to learn in venture capital is how and when to say “yes.” After all, you can’t have a lousy ROI if you don’t actually invest. The watershed moment for me as a venture capitalist came when I stopped looking for a low-risk deal and found one that was acceptably risky for all the right reasons. If I could just take back my hairstyle, those years would be among the best I’ve spent in business.